Vegetarian Discussion: Animals' "getting To Experience Life"

Animals' "getting To Experience Life"
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George Plimpton
2013-02-13 22:27:07 EST
There is no importance at all to the "getting". If some livestock
animals "get to experience life", that isn't good for them; and if no
livestock animals "get to experience life", that isn't bad for any
animals. If livestock animals exist, then experiencing a good life is
better for them than experiencing a bad life. It is not "better" for
the animals to experience a good life than never to live at all.

Rupert
2013-02-14 00:12:02 EST
On Thursday, February 14, 2013 4:27:07 AM UTC+1, George Plimpton wrote:
> There is no importance at all to the "getting". If some livestock
>
> animals "get to experience life", that isn't good for them; and if no
>
> livestock animals "get to experience life", that isn't bad for any
>
> animals. If livestock animals exist, then experiencing a good life is
>
> better for them than experiencing a bad life. It is not "better" for
>
> the animals to experience a good life than never to live at all.

In Volume One of his new book "On What Matters", moral philosopher Derek Parfit writes

"When we call one of two events better in the impartial-reason-implying sense, we mean that everyone would have, from an impartial point of view, stronger reasons to want this event to occur, or to hope that it will. It would be in this sense better, I believe, if some plague or earthquake killed fewer people, or if any person or other animal ceased to be in pain. This kind of goodness is impersonal in the sense that, when we call some event in this sense good, we don't mean that this event would be good for some person or group of people."

You, presumably, believe that there is no such kind of goodness. Is that because you think impartial reasons don't exist?

George Plimpton
2013-02-14 03:45:13 EST
On 2/13/2013 9:12 PM, Rupert wrote:
> On Thursday, February 14, 2013 4:27:07 AM UTC+1, George Plimpton wrote:
>> There is no importance at all to the "getting". If some livestock
>>
>> animals "get to experience life", that isn't good for them; and if no
>>
>> livestock animals "get to experience life", that isn't bad for any
>>
>> animals. If livestock animals exist, then experiencing a good life is
>>
>> better for them than experiencing a bad life. It is not "better" for
>>
>> the animals to experience a good life than never to live at all.
>
> In Volume One of his new book "On What Matters", moral philosopher Derek Parfit writes
>
> "When we call one of two events better in the impartial-reason-implying sense, we mean that everyone would have, from an impartial point of view, stronger reasons to want this event to occur, or to hope that it will. It would be in this sense better, I believe, if some plague or earthquake killed fewer people, or if any person or other animal ceased to be in pain. This kind of goodness is impersonal in the sense that, when we call some event in this sense good, we don't mean that this event would be good for some person or group of people."
>
> You, presumably, believe that there is no such kind of goodness. Is that because you think impartial reasons don't exist?

"Impartial reasons" is an undefined term. Google was not my friend; I
couldn't find anything that clarified it. What it sounds like is a lame
attempt at coming up with a $50 term as a substitute for "just because."

Suppose there is a massive earthquake in Turkey or Iran, as seems not to
be uncommon, and initial reports are that 100,000 people perished. A
day later, the estimated death toll is revised down to 50,000. Derek
Nash is elated. For whatever reason, he was greatly distressed at
learning of an estimated 100,000 deaths in the earthquake, and now his
distress is lessened by learning that only half as many people have died
as were initially feared. That doesn't sound impartial to me. Derek
doesn't have to explain why he feels less distress; all we need to know
is that he does, and thus we know that Derek is better off, and the
better state of affairs is not impartial at all.

Even if the question of "for whom is 'it' better" could be obviated by
an appeal to this lame notion of "impartial reasons", we're still faced
with the conundrum of *why* an outcome might be better; what *makes* it
better. There, the partisans of this "impartial reasons" bullshit seem
to be pushed into a position of saying "it just is", or "just because",
or "I don't know, I just think it is" - in other words, begging the
question.




>


Rupert
2013-02-14 04:07:07 EST
On Thursday, February 14, 2013 9:45:13 AM UTC+1, George Plimpton wrote:
> On 2/13/2013 9:12 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> > On Thursday, February 14, 2013 4:27:07 AM UTC+1, George Plimpton wrote:
>
> >> There is no importance at all to the "getting". If some livestock
>
> >>
>
> >> animals "get to experience life", that isn't good for them; and if no
>
> >>
>
> >> livestock animals "get to experience life", that isn't bad for any
>
> >>
>
> >> animals. If livestock animals exist, then experiencing a good life is
>
> >>
>
> >> better for them than experiencing a bad life. It is not "better" for
>
> >>
>
> >> the animals to experience a good life than never to live at all.
>
> >
>
> > In Volume One of his new book "On What Matters", moral philosopher Derek Parfit writes
>
> >
>
> > "When we call one of two events better in the impartial-reason-implying sense, we mean that everyone would have, from an impartial point of view, stronger reasons to want this event to occur, or to hope that it will. It would be in this sense better, I believe, if some plague or earthquake killed fewer people, or if any person or other animal ceased to be in pain. This kind of goodness is impersonal in the sense that, when we call some event in this sense good, we don't mean that this event would be good for some person or group of people."
>
> >
>
> > You, presumably, believe that there is no such kind of goodness. Is that because you think impartial reasons don't exist?
>
>
>
> "Impartial reasons" is an undefined term. Google was not my friend; I
>
> couldn't find anything that clarified it. What it sounds like is a lame
>
> attempt at coming up with a $50 term as a substitute for "just because."
>
>
>
> Suppose there is a massive earthquake in Turkey or Iran, as seems not to
>
> be uncommon, and initial reports are that 100,000 people perished. A
>
> day later, the estimated death toll is revised down to 50,000. Derek
>
> Nash is elated. For whatever reason, he was greatly distressed at
>
> learning of an estimated 100,000 deaths in the earthquake, and now his
>
> distress is lessened by learning that only half as many people have died
>
> as were initially feared. That doesn't sound impartial to me. Derek
>
> doesn't have to explain why he feels less distress; all we need to know
>
> is that he does, and thus we know that Derek is better off, and the
>
> better state of affairs is not impartial at all.
>
>
>
> Even if the question of "for whom is 'it' better" could be obviated by
>
> an appeal to this lame notion of "impartial reasons", we're still faced
>
> with the conundrum of *why* an outcome might be better; what *makes* it
>
> better. There, the partisans of this "impartial reasons" bullshit seem
>
> to be pushed into a position of saying "it just is", or "just because",
>
> or "I don't know, I just think it is" - in other words, begging the
>
> question.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >

I'll have a look later on and see if I can find anything that Derek Parfit says to further explain the notion of an "impartial reason". Sure, if you want to claim that there are impartial reasons, then you are faced with the problem of justifying the claims you make about what impartial reasons there are. But you could say the same about any theory that makes any normative claims at all, even the theory that says that we have a reason to avoid being in agony.

George Plimpton
2013-02-14 04:18:13 EST
On 2/14/2013 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
> On Thursday, February 14, 2013 9:45:13 AM UTC+1, George Plimpton wrote:
>> On 2/13/2013 9:12 PM, Rupert wrote:
>>
>>> On Thursday, February 14, 2013 4:27:07 AM UTC+1, George Plimpton wrote:
>>
>>>> There is no importance at all to the "getting". If some livestock
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> animals "get to experience life", that isn't good for them; and if no
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> livestock animals "get to experience life", that isn't bad for any
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> animals. If livestock animals exist, then experiencing a good life is
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> better for them than experiencing a bad life. It is not "better" for
>>
>>>>
>>
>>>> the animals to experience a good life than never to live at all.
>>
>>>
>>
>>> In Volume One of his new book "On What Matters", moral philosopher Derek Parfit writes
>>
>>>
>>
>>> "When we call one of two events better in the impartial-reason-implying sense, we mean that everyone would have, from an impartial point of view, stronger reasons to want this event to occur, or to hope that it will. It would be in this sense better, I believe, if some plague or earthquake killed fewer people, or if any person or other animal ceased to be in pain. This kind of goodness is impersonal in the sense that, when we call some event in this sense good, we don't mean that this event would be good for some person or group of people."
>>
>>>
>>
>>> You, presumably, believe that there is no such kind of goodness. Is that because you think impartial reasons don't exist?
>>
>>
>>
>> "Impartial reasons" is an undefined term. Google was not my friend; I
>>
>> couldn't find anything that clarified it. What it sounds like is a lame
>>
>> attempt at coming up with a $50 term as a substitute for "just because."
>>
>>
>>
>> Suppose there is a massive earthquake in Turkey or Iran, as seems not to
>>
>> be uncommon, and initial reports are that 100,000 people perished. A
>>
>> day later, the estimated death toll is revised down to 50,000. Derek
>>
>> Nash is elated. For whatever reason, he was greatly distressed at
>>
>> learning of an estimated 100,000 deaths in the earthquake, and now his
>>
>> distress is lessened by learning that only half as many people have died
>>
>> as were initially feared. That doesn't sound impartial to me. Derek
>>
>> doesn't have to explain why he feels less distress; all we need to know
>>
>> is that he does, and thus we know that Derek is better off, and the
>>
>> better state of affairs is not impartial at all.
>>
>>
>>
>> Even if the question of "for whom is 'it' better" could be obviated by
>>
>> an appeal to this lame notion of "impartial reasons", we're still faced
>>
>> with the conundrum of *why* an outcome might be better; what *makes* it
>>
>> better. There, the partisans of this "impartial reasons" bullshit seem
>>
>> to be pushed into a position of saying "it just is", or "just because",
>>
>> or "I don't know, I just think it is" - in other words, begging the
>>
>> question.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>
> I'll have a look later on and see if I can find anything that Derek Parfit says to further explain the notion of an "impartial reason". Sure, if you want to claim that there are impartial reasons, then you are faced with the problem of justifying the claims you make about what impartial reasons there are. But you could say the same about any theory that makes any normative claims at all, even the theory that says that we have a reason to avoid being in agony.

No. You don't need a theory to support the idea that people don't want
to be in agony. They can objectively demonstrate they don't want to be
in agony.


>


Rupert
2013-02-14 04:57:26 EST
On Thursday, February 14, 2013 10:18:13 AM UTC+1, George Plimpton wrote:
> On 2/14/2013 1:07 AM, Rupert wrote:
>
> > On Thursday, February 14, 2013 9:45:13 AM UTC+1, George Plimpton wrote:
>
> >> On 2/13/2013 9:12 PM, Rupert wrote:
>
> >>
>
> >>> On Thursday, February 14, 2013 4:27:07 AM UTC+1, George Plimpton wrote:
>
> >>
>
> >>>> There is no importance at all to the "getting". If some livestock
>
> >>
>
> >>>>
>
> >>
>
> >>>> animals "get to experience life", that isn't good for them; and if no
>
> >>
>
> >>>>
>
> >>
>
> >>>> livestock animals "get to experience life", that isn't bad for any
>
> >>
>
> >>>>
>
> >>
>
> >>>> animals. If livestock animals exist, then experiencing a good life is
>
> >>
>
> >>>>
>
> >>
>
> >>>> better for them than experiencing a bad life. It is not "better" for
>
> >>
>
> >>>>
>
> >>
>
> >>>> the animals to experience a good life than never to live at all.
>
> >>
>
> >>>
>
> >>
>
> >>> In Volume One of his new book "On What Matters", moral philosopher Derek Parfit writes
>
> >>
>
> >>>
>
> >>
>
> >>> "When we call one of two events better in the impartial-reason-implying sense, we mean that everyone would have, from an impartial point of view, stronger reasons to want this event to occur, or to hope that it will. It would be in this sense better, I believe, if some plague or earthquake killed fewer people, or if any person or other animal ceased to be in pain. This kind of goodness is impersonal in the sense that, when we call some event in this sense good, we don't mean that this event would be good for some person or group of people."
>
> >>
>
> >>>
>
> >>
>
> >>> You, presumably, believe that there is no such kind of goodness. Is that because you think impartial reasons don't exist?
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >> "Impartial reasons" is an undefined term. Google was not my friend; I
>
> >>
>
> >> couldn't find anything that clarified it. What it sounds like is a lame
>
> >>
>
> >> attempt at coming up with a $50 term as a substitute for "just because."
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >> Suppose there is a massive earthquake in Turkey or Iran, as seems not to
>
> >>
>
> >> be uncommon, and initial reports are that 100,000 people perished. A
>
> >>
>
> >> day later, the estimated death toll is revised down to 50,000. Derek
>
> >>
>
> >> Nash is elated. For whatever reason, he was greatly distressed at
>
> >>
>
> >> learning of an estimated 100,000 deaths in the earthquake, and now his
>
> >>
>
> >> distress is lessened by learning that only half as many people have died
>
> >>
>
> >> as were initially feared. That doesn't sound impartial to me. Derek
>
> >>
>
> >> doesn't have to explain why he feels less distress; all we need to know
>
> >>
>
> >> is that he does, and thus we know that Derek is better off, and the
>
> >>
>
> >> better state of affairs is not impartial at all.
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >> Even if the question of "for whom is 'it' better" could be obviated by
>
> >>
>
> >> an appeal to this lame notion of "impartial reasons", we're still faced
>
> >>
>
> >> with the conundrum of *why* an outcome might be better; what *makes* it
>
> >>
>
> >> better. There, the partisans of this "impartial reasons" bullshit seem
>
> >>
>
> >> to be pushed into a position of saying "it just is", or "just because",
>
> >>
>
> >> or "I don't know, I just think it is" - in other words, begging the
>
> >>
>
> >> question.
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >>>
>
> >
>
> > I'll have a look later on and see if I can find anything that Derek Parfit says to further explain the notion of an "impartial reason". Sure, if you want to claim that there are impartial reasons, then you are faced with the problem of justifying the claims you make about what impartial reasons there are. But you could say the same about any theory that makes any normative claims at all, even the theory that says that we have a reason to avoid being in agony.
>
>
>
> No. You don't need a theory to support the idea that people don't want
>
> to be in agony. They can objectively demonstrate they don't want to be
>
> in agony.
>
>
>
>
>
> >

What about a hypothetical case where a person, strangely enough, has the desire that they be in agony in the future? Does that person have a reason to avoid being in agony?

D*@.
2013-02-18 15:51:10 EST
On Wed, 13 Feb 2013 19:27:07 -0800, Goo claimed:

>It is not "better" for [Rupert or my son] ... to experience a good life than
>never to live at all.

Why do you think it's not better for your son to experience a good life than
never to live at all Goob? Why do you think it's not better for Rupert to
experience a good life than never to live at all, Goo?

George Plimpton
2013-02-18 16:30:48 EST
On 2/18/2013 12:51 PM, Fuckwit David Harrison - *Goo* - showed his
cracker ass again and 'outstupided' himself:

> On 2/13/2013 7:27 PM, George Plimpton wrote:> There is no importance at all to the "getting". If some livestock
>> animals "get to experience life", that isn't good for them; and if no
>> livestock animals "get to experience life", that isn't bad for any
>> animals. If livestock animals exist, then experiencing a good life is
>> better for them than experiencing a bad life. It is not "better" for
>> the animals to experience a good life than never to live at all.
>
> Why do you think it's not better for your son to experience a good life than
> never to live at all

Because the comparison makes no sense from his perspective (or 'pov',
LOL!), *Goo*. It's better for *me* to have my son living a good life
rather than no life at all, but not for him.

The comparison cannot be done, *Goo*. This has been demonstrated to you
beyond dispute. From the perspective of a living entity's welfare,
*Goo*, it is only possible to compare alternate states of existence;
*NOT* existence with non-existence.


D*@.
2013-02-20 15:52:24 EST
On Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:30:48 -0800, Goo disagreed with himself:

>On Mon, 18 Feb 2013 15:51:10 -0500, dh@. wrote:
>
>>On Wed, 13 Feb 2013 19:27:07 -0800, Goo claimed:
>>
>>>It is not "better" for [Rupert or my son] ... to experience a good life than
>>>never to live at all.
>>
>> Why do you think it's not better for your son to experience a good life than
>>never to live at all Goob? Why do you think it's not better for Rupert to
>>experience a good life than never to live at all, Goo?
>
>The comparison cannot be done, *Goo*.

"A high-welfare life is not a "benefit" compared
with never existing." - Goo

>This has been demonstrated to you
>beyond dispute.

"coming into existence didn't make me better off than
I was before." - Goo

>From the perspective of a living entity's welfare,

"Existing animals don't figure into it in any way." - Goo.

>*Goo*, it is only possible to compare alternate states of existence;

"It is not "better" for the animals to experience a good life than
never to live at all." - Goo

>*NOT* existence with non-existence.

Goober, you make the comparison directly and also tell us you know the
result of that comparison EVERY TIME you make it:

"No animal is "better off" as a result of existing, versus
never existing." - Goo

How do you want people to think you think you found out the result of a
comparison you also claim can't be made, Goo???

D*@.
2013-02-20 15:52:40 EST
On Mon, 18 Feb 2013, the Goober disagreed with himself:

>On 2/18/2013 12:51 PM, dh challenged the Goober:
>
>> On 2/13/2013 7:27 PM, Goo wrote:> There is no importance at all to the "getting". If some livestock
>>> animals "get to experience life", that isn't good for them; and if no
>>> livestock animals "get to experience life", that isn't bad for any
>>> animals. If livestock animals exist, then experiencing a good life is
>>> better for them than experiencing a bad life. It is not "better" for
>>> the animals to experience a good life than never to live at all.
>>
>> Why do you think it's not better for your son to experience a good life than
>> never to live at all, you stupid Goober?
>
>Because the comparison makes no sense from his perspective (or 'pov',
>LOL!), Goo. It's better for *me* to have my son living a good life
>rather than no life at all, but not for him.

"I give the lives of animals that exist *LOTS*
of consideration. I also give the not-yet-begun lives
of animals that are "in the pipeline", so to speak, a
lot of consideration" - Goo

>The comparison cannot be done,

"A high-welfare life is not a "benefit" compared
with never existing." - Goo

>Goo.

"it is not "better" that the animal exist, no matter
its quality of live" - Goo

>This has been demonstrated to you beyond dispute.

"coming into existence didn't make me better off than
I was before." - Goo

>From the perspective of a living entity's welfare,

"Existing animals don't figure into it in any way." - Goo.

>Goo,

"It is not "better" for the animals to experience a good life than
never to live at all." - Goo

>it is only possible to compare alternate states of existence;

"Coming into existence is not a benefit to them: it does
not make them better off than before" - Goo

>*NOT* existence with non-existence.

Goober, you make the comparison directly and also tell us you know the
result of that comparison EVERY TIME you make it:

"No animal is "better off" as a result of existing, versus
never existing." - Goo

How do you want people to think you think you found out the result of a
comparison you also claim can't be made, Goo???
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