Vegetarian Discussion: Kindness Vs Rights

Kindness Vs Rights
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Jerry
2008-10-19 21:46:23 EST
Contrary to popular confusion of thought by Objectivists, it is
possible to be kind to a dog or a cat or a pig without granting to the
animal the right to vote or the right to own property.

Rudy Canoza
2008-10-19 23:46:59 EST
Jerry wrote:
> Contrary to popular confusion of thought by Objectivists, it is
> possible to be kind to a dog or a cat or a pig without granting to the
> animal the right to vote or the right to own property.

Animals don't have /any/ rights; nor should they.

Rupert
2008-10-20 02:45:14 EST
On Oct 20, 11:46 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...@thedismalscience.noot> wrote:
> Jerry wrote:
> > Contrary to popular confusion of thought by Objectivists, it is
> > possible to be kind to a dog or a cat or a pig without granting to the
> > animal the right to vote or the right to own property.
>
> Animals don't have /any/ rights; nor should they.

An individual holds a right against a moral agent that they not do X
if it is morally impermissible for the agent to do X, and if it is
morally permissible for the individual (if the individual is a moral
agent) or for others, on the individuals' behalf, to use force to
prevent the agent from doing X, or to punish the agent for having done
X.

Consider the example of someone setting fire to a cat. It is pretty
much universally believed that it is morally impermissible to set fire
to a cat and that it is permissible for others to use force on the
cat's behalf to prevent someone from setting fire to a cat or to
punish someone for setting fire to a cat. If this is correct, then
some nonhuman animals, under some circumstances, have some rights.

The denial of this is pretty extreme.

You don't have to buy into what is commonly called "animal rights
theory", or some approximation thereto, in order to hold that some
nonhuman animals under some circumstances have some rights. Just about
everyone believes that some nonhuman animals under some circumstances
have some rights; even Tibor Machan, despite his denial.

If you really want to claim that nonhuman animals have no rights you
are setting forth a very extreme position which pretty much no-one
holds and it needs defending.

Rudy Canoza
2008-10-20 10:37:13 EST
Rupert wrote:
> On Oct 20, 11:46 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...@thedismalscience.noot> wrote:
>> Jerry wrote:
>>> Contrary to popular confusion of thought by Objectivists, it is
>>> possible to be kind to a dog or a cat or a pig without granting to the
>>> animal the right to vote or the right to own property.
>> Animals don't have /any/ rights; nor should they.
>
> An individual holds a right against a moral agent that they not do X
> if it is morally impermissible for the agent to do X,

Animals hold no such "rights".

Rupert
2008-10-20 21:07:02 EST
On Oct 20, 10:37 pm, Rudy Canoza <pi...@thedismalscience.noot> wrote:
> Rupert wrote:
> > On Oct 20, 11:46 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...@thedismalscience.noot> wrote:
> >> Jerry wrote:
> >>> Contrary to popular confusion of thought by Objectivists, it is
> >>> possible to be kind to a dog or a cat or a pig without granting to the
> >>> animal the right to vote or the right to own property.
> >> Animals don't have /any/ rights; nor should they.
>
> > An individual holds a right against a moral agent that they not do X
> > if it is morally impermissible for the agent to do X,
>
> Animals hold no such "rights".

So, Ball, you have this interesting idea that I don't think that
you're phenomenally stupid, and that I don't laugh out loud when you
claim I don't think this. That's really interesting.

Have a good day.

Dutch
2008-10-20 23:14:36 EST
"Rupert" <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> wrote
On Oct 20, 11:46 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...@thedismalscience.noot> wrote:
> Jerry wrote:
> > Contrary to popular confusion of thought by Objectivists, it is
> > possible to be kind to a dog or a cat or a pig without granting to the
> > animal the right to vote or the right to own property.
>
> Animals don't have /any/ rights; nor should they.

An individual holds a right against a moral agent that they not do X
if it is morally impermissible for the agent to do X,

-------
That is redundant. Saying that an individual holds a right against a moral
agent that they not do X *is stating* the moral impermissibility of doing X.

and if it is
morally permissible for the individual (if the individual is a moral
agent) or for others, on the individuals' behalf, to use force to
prevent the agent from doing X, or to punish the agent for having done
X.

------------
I don't find this bit necessary. One, say a passivist, may not find it
morally permissible to intervene or use violence to prevent an act and yet
still hold that the individual has the right. Your girlfriend getting felt
up for example..


Consider the example of someone setting fire to a cat. It is pretty
much universally believed that it is morally impermissible to set fire
to a cat and that it is permissible for others to use force on the
cat's behalf to prevent someone from setting fire to a cat or to
punish someone for setting fire to a cat. If this is correct, then
some nonhuman animals, under some circumstances, have some rights.

The denial of this is pretty extreme.

----------
Not really, he believes that setting fire to a cat is a violation of a code
of human conduct, not a violation of the rights of an animal.


You don't have to buy into what is commonly called "animal rights
theory", or some approximation thereto, in order to hold that some
nonhuman animals under some circumstances have some rights. Just about
everyone believes that some nonhuman animals under some circumstances
have some rights; even Tibor Machan, despite his denial.

If you really want to claim that nonhuman animals have no rights you
are setting forth a very extreme position which pretty much no-one
holds and it needs defending.

------------
He doesn't think that it is morally permissible to set fire to cats, he just
does not attribute the prohibition to cat rights.




Rudy Canoza
2008-10-20 23:22:10 EST
Rupert wrote:
> On Oct 20, 10:37 pm, Rudy Canoza <pi...@thedismalscience.noot> wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>>> On Oct 20, 11:46 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...@thedismalscience.noot> wrote:
>>>> Jerry wrote:
>>>>> Contrary to popular confusion of thought by Objectivists, it is
>>>>> possible to be kind to a dog or a cat or a pig without granting to the
>>>>> animal the right to vote or the right to own property.
>>>> Animals don't have /any/ rights; nor should they.
>>> An individual holds a right against a moral agent that they not do X
>>> if it is morally impermissible for the agent to do X,
>> Animals hold no such "rights".
>
> So, Rudy, I don't think that
> you're phenomenally stupid,

Right.

Rupert
2008-10-27 21:19:30 EST
On Oct 21, 11:14 am, "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote:
> "Rupert" <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote
> On Oct 20, 11:46 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...@thedismalscience.noot> wrote:
>
> > Jerry wrote:
> > > Contrary to popular confusion of thought by Objectivists, it is
> > > possible to be kind to a dog or a cat or a pig without granting to the
> > > animal the right to vote or the right to own property.
>
> > Animals don't have /any/ rights; nor should they.
>
> An individual holds a right against a moral agent that they not do X
> if it is morally impermissible for the agent to do X,
>
> -------
> That is redundant. Saying that an individual holds a right against a moral
> agent that they not do X *is stating* the moral impermissibility of doing X.
>

I'm giving a definition. Of course I'm just restating it in different
words; that's the whole point.

> and if it is
> morally permissible for the individual (if the individual is a moral
> agent) or for others, on the individuals' behalf, to use force to
> prevent the agent from doing X, or to punish the agent for having done
> X.
>
> ------------
> I don't find this bit necessary. One, say a passivist, may not find it
> morally permissible to intervene or use violence to prevent an act and yet
> still hold that the individual has the right. Your girlfriend getting felt
> up for example..
>

He didn't have the right to touch her in that way and I was morally
entitled to use some measure of force in response. Breaking his nose
the first time he did it would probably have been a bit over the top.
What I actually did was speak to him about it. He then pushed me in
the chest. Ball says if I were a real man I would then have broken his
nose. I felt that it wasn't really my job to deal with it myself and
the bouncers and policemen who were present ought to do what they were
paid to do. Instead they escorted me out.

He committed a rights violation and some measure of force in response
was justified. On the other hand, if she goes up to him and kisses
him, that's not terribly morally kosher but it's not a rights
violation and the use of force is not justified. I can respond by
breaking up with her, or by some other less extreme but non-coercive
measure.

> Consider the example of someone setting fire to a cat. It is pretty
> much universally believed that it is morally impermissible to set fire
> to a cat and that it is permissible for others to use force on the
> cat's behalf to prevent someone from setting fire to a cat or to
> punish someone for setting fire to a cat. If this is correct, then
> some nonhuman animals, under some circumstances, have some rights.
>
> The denial of this is pretty extreme.
>
> ----------
> Not really, he believes that setting fire to a cat is a violation of a code
> of human conduct, not a violation of the rights of an animal.
>

My point is that if he believes that the constrant is enforceable then
it counts as a moral right. I claim that that is what a moral right
is. If he doesn't like that definition then he is free to provide his
own. Instead he provides a typical inane non-response.

> You don't have to buy into what is commonly called "animal rights
> theory", or some approximation thereto, in order to hold that some
> nonhuman animals under some circumstances have some rights. Just about
> everyone believes that some nonhuman animals under some circumstances
> have some rights; even Tibor Machan, despite his denial.
>
> If you really want to claim that nonhuman animals have no rights you
> are setting forth a very extreme position which pretty much no-one
> holds and it needs defending.
>
> ------------
> He doesn't think that it is morally permissible to set fire to cats, he just
> does not attribute the prohibition to cat rights.

See above. I claim that if he thinks that the constraint is
enforceable then it ought to be called a right. Anyone else is free to
offer their own definition of what a right is if they think I have it
wrong.

Dutch
2008-10-27 22:56:25 EST

"Rupert" <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> wrote
On Oct 21, 11:14 am, "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote:
> "Rupert" <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote
> On Oct 20, 11:46 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...@thedismalscience.noot> wrote:
>
> > Jerry wrote:
> > > Contrary to popular confusion of thought by Objectivists, it is
> > > possible to be kind to a dog or a cat or a pig without granting to the
> > > animal the right to vote or the right to own property.
>
> > Animals don't have /any/ rights; nor should they.
>
> An individual holds a right against a moral agent that they not do X
> if it is morally impermissible for the agent to do X,
>
> -------
> That is redundant. Saying that an individual holds a right against a moral
> agent that they not do X *is stating* the moral impermissibility of doing
> X.
>

I'm giving a definition. Of course I'm just restating it in different
words; that's the whole point.

--------
I'm just telling you that your wording is redundant, which makes it
confusing and misleading.


> and if it is
> morally permissible for the individual (if the individual is a moral
> agent) or for others, on the individuals' behalf, to use force to
> prevent the agent from doing X, or to punish the agent for having done
> X.
>
> ------------
> I don't find this bit necessary. One, say a passivist, may not find it
> morally permissible to intervene or use violence to prevent an act and yet
> still hold that the individual has the right. Your girlfriend getting felt
> up for example..
>

He didn't have the right to touch her in that way and I was morally
entitled to use some measure of force in response.

-------------
According to your moral understanding, and I agree, but even if you did not
believe you had a moral right to retaliate the violation would exist all the
same.

Breaking his nose
the first time he did it would probably have been a bit over the top.
What I actually did was speak to him about it. He then pushed me in
the chest. Ball says if I were a real man I would then have broken his
nose. I felt that it wasn't really my job to deal with it myself and
the bouncers and policemen who were present ought to do what they were
paid to do. Instead they escorted me out.

--------------
That's a typical bouncer response. It's much easier and less dangerous for
them to eject a victim.


He committed a rights violation and some measure of force in response
was justified. On the other hand, if she goes up to him and kisses
him, that's not terribly morally kosher but it's not a rights
violation and the use of force is not justified. I can respond by
breaking up with her, or by some other less extreme but non-coercive
measure.

> Consider the example of someone setting fire to a cat. It is pretty
> much universally believed that it is morally impermissible to set fire
> to a cat and that it is permissible for others to use force on the
> cat's behalf to prevent someone from setting fire to a cat or to
> punish someone for setting fire to a cat. If this is correct, then
> some nonhuman animals, under some circumstances, have some rights.
>
> The denial of this is pretty extreme.
>
> ----------
> Not really, he believes that setting fire to a cat is a violation of a
> code
> of human conduct, not a violation of the rights of an animal.
>

My point is that if he believes that the constrant is enforceable then
it counts as a moral right.

-----
Not necessarily. see below


I claim that that is what a moral right
is. If he doesn't like that definition then he is free to provide his
own. Instead he provides a typical inane non-response.

> You don't have to buy into what is commonly called "animal rights
> theory", or some approximation thereto, in order to hold that some
> nonhuman animals under some circumstances have some rights. Just about
> everyone believes that some nonhuman animals under some circumstances
> have some rights; even Tibor Machan, despite his denial.
>
> If you really want to claim that nonhuman animals have no rights you
> are setting forth a very extreme position which pretty much no-one
> holds and it needs defending.
>
> ------------
> He doesn't think that it is morally permissible to set fire to cats, he
> just
> does not attribute the prohibition to cat rights.

See above. I claim that if he thinks that the constraint is
enforceable then it ought to be called a right. Anyone else is free to
offer their own definition of what a right is if they think I have it
wrong.

-------------
Personally, I see nothing wrong with calling it a right, but others see it
differently. You may be prohibited from damaging my car with a bat, but
that does not mean that my car is a rights-holder.


Rupert
2008-10-28 19:36:12 EST
On Oct 28, 2:56 am, "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote:
> "Rupert" <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote
> On Oct 21, 11:14 am, "Dutch" <n...@email.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > "Rupert" <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote
> > On Oct 20, 11:46 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...@thedismalscience.noot> wrote:
>
> > > Jerry wrote:
> > > > Contrary to popular confusion of thought by Objectivists, it is
> > > > possible to be kind to a dog or a cat or a pig without granting to the
> > > > animal the right to vote or the right to own property.
>
> > > Animals don't have /any/ rights; nor should they.
>
> > An individual holds a right against a moral agent that they not do X
> > if it is morally impermissible for the agent to do X,
>
> > -------
> > That is redundant. Saying that an individual holds a right against a moral
> > agent that they not do X *is stating* the moral impermissibility of doing
> > X.
>
> I'm giving a definition. Of course I'm just restating it in different
> words; that's the whole point.
>
> --------
> I'm just telling you that your wording is redundant, which makes it
> confusing and misleading.
>

I don't see how the wording is redundant, but never mind.

> > and if it is
> > morally permissible for the individual (if the individual is a moral
> > agent) or for others, on the individuals' behalf, to use force to
> > prevent the agent from doing X, or to punish the agent for having done
> > X.
>
> > ------------
> > I don't find this bit necessary. One, say a passivist, may not find it
> > morally permissible to intervene or use violence to prevent an act and yet
> > still hold that the individual has the right. Your girlfriend getting felt
> > up for example..
>
> He didn't have the right to touch her in that way and I was morally
> entitled to use some measure of force in response.
>
> -------------
> According to your moral understanding, and I agree, but even if you did not
> believe you had a moral right to retaliate the violation would exist all the
> same.
>

I'm claiming that in that case it would be an example of a morally
impermissible action which is not a rights violation. Some actions are
morally impermissible but the use of coercion to prevent or punish
them is not justified. Cheating on your partner would be one example.
I claim that if it's not justified to use coercion to prevent or
punish the behaviour, then it doesn't count as a rights violation. In
fact I'm claiming that that's a necessary and sufficient condition for
it not to count as a rights violation.

Perhaps you think that cheating on your partner *is* a rights
violation? Or can you give me some other example of a morally
impermissible act such that the use of force is not justified to
prevent or punish it, but which you regard as a rights violation?

> Breaking his nose
> the first time he did it would probably have been a bit over the top.
> What I actually did was speak to him about it. He then pushed me in
> the chest. Ball says if I were a real man I would then have broken his
> nose. I felt that it wasn't really my job to deal with it myself and
> the bouncers and policemen who were present ought to do what they were
> paid to do. Instead they escorted me out.
>
> --------------
> That's a typical bouncer response. It's much easier and less dangerous for
> them to eject a victim.
>

I dare say. My girlfriend also pointed out that they don't get paid
very much.

> He committed a rights violation and some measure of force in response
> was justified. On the other hand, if she goes up to him and kisses
> him, that's not terribly morally kosher but it's not a rights
> violation and the use of force is not justified. I can respond by
> breaking up with her, or by some other less extreme but non-coercive
> measure.
>
> > Consider the example of someone setting fire to a cat. It is pretty
> > much universally believed that it is morally impermissible to set fire
> > to a cat and that it is permissible for others to use force on the
> > cat's behalf to prevent someone from setting fire to a cat or to
> > punish someone for setting fire to a cat. If this is correct, then
> > some nonhuman animals, under some circumstances, have some rights.
>
> > The denial of this is pretty extreme.
>
> > ----------
> > Not really, he believes that setting fire to a cat is a violation of a
> > code
> > of human conduct, not a violation of the rights of an animal.
>
> My point is that if he believes that the constrant is enforceable then
> it counts as a moral right.
>
> -----
> Not necessarily. see below
>
> I claim that that is what a moral right
> is. If he doesn't like that definition then he is free to provide his
> own. Instead he provides a typical inane non-response.
>
> > You don't have to buy into what is commonly called "animal rights
> > theory", or some approximation thereto, in order to hold that some
> > nonhuman animals under some circumstances have some rights. Just about
> > everyone believes that some nonhuman animals under some circumstances
> > have some rights; even Tibor Machan, despite his denial.
>
> > If you really want to claim that nonhuman animals have no rights you
> > are setting forth a very extreme position which pretty much no-one
> > holds and it needs defending.
>
> > ------------
> > He doesn't think that it is morally permissible to set fire to cats, he
> > just
> > does not attribute the prohibition to cat rights.
>
> See above. I claim that if he thinks that the constraint is
> enforceable then it ought to be called a right. Anyone else is free to
> offer their own definition of what a right is if they think I have it
> wrong.
>
> -------------
> Personally, I see nothing wrong with calling it a right, but others see it
> differently. You may be prohibited from damaging my car with a bat, but
> that does not mean that my car is a rights-holder.

True. But it does mean that I am violating someone's rights when I
damage your car (provided the use of force is justified in response).
If you're justified in using force in response then a rights violation
must have happened, although it's not necessarily the case that the
car is a rightsholder. Or so libertarians claim, anyway. If you agree
with this position (and Ball and Tibor Machan both say they're
libertarians) then if you think it's justifiable to use force to
prevent someone from setting fire to the cat, then some individual's
rights must be violated when the cat is set fire to. As you observe,
you can explain it away as an indirect duty deriving from your
obligations to some individual other than the cat. But what if the cat
is no-one's property? Most people think the constraint still applies.
In that case, whose rights are violated if not the cat's?
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